I read the whole article here: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/12/security_in_ten.html. What interested me the most was this part:
I highly recommend reading the article. Very interesting.
I'm not too computer-saavy, so I looked up alot of the terms in the list. I found some of them, but I was wonedering if anyone could shed some more light on the last 4 items on the list.What's shocking and disappointing to me is that our responses to those problems also remain the same, in spite of the obvious fact that they aren't effective. It's 2007 and we haven't seemed to accept that:
The list could go on for several pages, but it would be too depressing. It would be "Marcus' list of obvious stuff that everybody knows but nobody accepts."
- You can't turn shovelware into reliable software by patching it a whole lot.
- You shouldn't mix production systems with non-production systems.
- You actually have to know what's going on in your networks.
- If you run your computers with an open execution runtime model you'll always get viruses, spyware and Trojan horses.
- You can pass laws about locking barn doors after horses have left, but it won't put the horses back in the barn.
- Security has to be designed in, as part of a system plan for reliability, rather than bolted on afterward.
I highly recommend reading the article. Very interesting.